On 22 July the US Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, known as a 123 agreement after the section of US law that governs such deals.1 The White House sent it to Congress in late August. Congress has 90 days of continuous session to pass a resolution blocking it; if it does nothing, the agreement can take effect.2
What the text allows
US nuclear deals with countries outside the established nuclear club have often sought a commitment not to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, the two routes to bomb material. This one does not contain that commitment. Its Article 7 allows the two sides to explore options for Saudi civil enrichment capacity, and limits facilities using US-supplied equipment to enrichment below 5%, the level used in power reactors.3 According to an analysis by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a two-year joint study could lead to enrichment up to 5% on Saudi soil, followed by a study of higher-assay fuel up to 20%.4 The US keeps a veto over enrichment or reprocessing involving US-supplied material, as the law requires.5
The agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which allows short-notice inspections and is the strongest tool inspectors have for finding undeclared activity.5 Two side letters remain classified.4 Alan Kuperman, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, reports that the classified portion submitted to Congress includes a blank page labelled "to be filled in later", which he argues makes it impossible for lawmakers to certify that the deal complies with the law.6
The arguments
The administration says the deal upholds "the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation", and supporters argue that if the US does not supply Saudi Arabia's reactors, China or Russia will, with fewer conditions.1 A legal reading in Nuclear Engineering International is that the text meets the letter of the Atomic Energy Act.5 Critics across the political spectrum, from Senator Ed Markey to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and AIPAC, argue that it weakens long-standing US standards and leaves open a path to weapons; Markey has introduced a bill to block it until conditions are met.2 After signing, President Trump said the deal is "totally subject to" Saudi normalisation of relations with Israel.2
Why it matters
Saudi Arabia's crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, said in 2023 that if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, "we have to get one".7 Iran now holds about 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, whose size and location inspectors have not been able to verify since the 2025 strikes, and its officials are debating leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty.8 An enrichment capability in Saudi Arabia, however tightly limited at first, would put the main technical building block of a weapons programme within reach of a government that has said when it would want one.
The existential concern is not one more nuclear power in itself. It is a cascade: each new nuclear-armed state in a region already at war multiplies the number of crises that could go nuclear and the number of leaders whose miscalculation could start an exchange.